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E XPEHT WITNESSEs' general reputation for veracity is not untainted. 
In the elegant and tasteful expression of Harold Cn·Pn, director of the 
Law, Science, and Technology Program at George \Vashington U niver-
sity, "Expert witnesses are whores .... " Others interviewed for a 
newspaper article on science and public policy, in which Green's state-
ment appears, were somewhat more charitable in their diction, but af-
firmed that expert witnesses were "chosen not for their wisdom or sa-
gacity but for their willingness to say in the simplest, clearest, least 
tentative way what a particular side wants said." 1 
On the other hand, some scholars who have served as experts, who 
are not, perhaps, entirely unbiased witnesses on the topic, claim to have 
retained their virtue. James Rosse, a Stanford economist who was re-
Previous versions of' this paper were given at the Social Science History Association Con-
vention in 1981, at the Association of American Law Schools Convention in HJI:l.1, and at 
the Caltech History Colloquium in 1983. One of the special joys of writing and giving thi, 
paper has been the chance to learn from people whose attention I would not usually he 
able to tkmand. I particularly want to thank for their comments Brian Barry, Derrick Bell, 
John Benton, Armand Derfner, Jim O'Fallon, Phil Hoffman, Will Jones, Dan Kevles, 
Steve 1\lorse, and Ed Still. Since it seems likelv that all of tlwm retain some reservations 
about the paper, none should he hdd responsiiJie for its remaining Haws. 
I. Lee Dembart, '"Science and Public Policy-Who h S<"r\"!·d'"' Los Angell's Times, 
November 9, 1981. 
.5 
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portedly paid $240,000 by American Telephone and Telegraph in 1981 
to perform studies in support of that corporation's position in its anti-
trust case, contended that "the legal process would tear to shreds any 
person who altered his views for a trial," and asserted that he informed 
the company that "there are things I will not testify to." Dean Henry 
Hossovsky of Harvard, an economist who testified for IBM during its an-
titrust case, insisted that sdwlars who do this type of consulting have a 
strong inccn tive not to distort their views or to dissimulate, because 
they must protect their professional reputations. "They don't have any 
other assets of significance," Rossovsky told a New York Times reporter. 
"If you get the reputation ofbeing a hired gun, it won't help you."2 
The question of the possible tensions between advocacy and objectiv-
ity presents somewhat different facets to the three groups most directly 
concerned with expert witnessing: scholars, lawyers, and judges. Re-
sponding to historian Lee Benson's 1977 Social Science History Asso-
ciation presidential address, which had the provocative title "Changing 
Social Science to Change the World," political scientist Warren Miller 
distinguished between pure and applied science and commented that 
"the motivation to do good-or bad-is simply different from the mo-
tivation to find out how things work, and it is the transformation of the 
latter motivation into action that is science."3 For historians, more par-
ticularly, the crux of the problem is not the old epistemological chest-
nut, "Can the study of history he objective?" but a simpler and less ab-
solute, if longer, question: "Assuming that it makes sense to say that 
some analyses are more objective than others, are historians who serve 
as expert witnesses likely to be less objective, either because of their 
own commitments or because of some aspects of the legal process, than 
other historians are, or than the witnesses themselves are when they are 
doing their normal scholarship?" 
Lawyers see the topic from a different vantage point. If my experi-
ence with them is at all representative, attorneys tend to believe that 
their own experts are pure, even to the point of being too prissy to agree 
to state their own conclusions in a way which would be most helpful to 
the lawyers' clients-while the other side's are merely lying for money. 
Should lawyers treat expert witnesses-for either side or both-as an-
alogues to celebrity endorsers of products? Is Dr. K's analysis of the rea-
sons for the adoption of the Mobile city government act in the 1870s 
worthy of more deference than Dr. J's endorsement of a basketball 
sneaker? 
2. Fox Butlt·rfidd, "Faculty Consultants: Higll('r Educators Getting Higher Fees," 
Los A11geles Herald Examiner, June 16, 191>2. Since historians' fees for a ease are on the 
order of 1 perct:nt of Rosse's, their inc:entives to play paladin are considerably less. 
3. Benson s address and Millers response are hoth in Social Science History 2 
(1978), 427-48. The Miller quotation appears on p. 444. 
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Judges, whose distorted "law office" versions of history written to 
serve their own points of view reverberate from Dred Scott through 
Wesberry v. Sanders (the Georgia legislative reapportionment case) to 
Mobile v. Bolden, may see the problem of experts· objectivity in yet an-
other guise. 4 Have expert witnesses, to paraphrase ChiefJ ustice Taney's 
famous phrase in Dred Scott, any opinions that judges are bound tore-
spect? Is the view of a credentialed historian or other social scientist en-
titled to any more weight than that of a man on the street or a random 
law clerk, or than the judge's own "common sense'"? (In two of the cases 
in which I've been involved-not, let it he noted, ones in which the side 
which I was testitfying for won-the judges' answers, as implied by their 
opinions, have been "Yes, if the witnesses agree with my preconceived, 
seat-of-the-pants opinion; otherwise, no.") 
My own experience as an expert witness in six voting rights cases 
causes me to doubt the soundness of \Varren Miller's observation, 
quoted above. Changing the world and doing normal social science or 
history are not such different pursuits after all. Perhaps I am blinded by 
good intentions or the heat of battle, but it seems to me that cases from 
Birmingham; Mobile; Selma; Brownsville, Te;111essee; and Sumter, 
South Carolina; as well as an appearance before a House Judiciary Sub-
committee hearing on renewing the Voting Hights Act, afforded me op-
portunities to tell the truth a111l do good at the same time. 
Those of us who desire to bring scholarship to bear on current policy 
problems, moreover, need no new institutional arrangement to make 
our advocacy more effective. Indeed, the organization of a group of pro-
gressive scholars to produce policy-relevant studies, such as Lee Ben~ 
son has proposed, might well reduce, rather than increase, its members 
ability to influence policy. 5 For not only would it call into question the 
scholars' reputation for objectivity-which my experience has taught 
me is a necessary condition for them to exert any influence at all-but 
by removing some of the usual professional checks on slipshod schol-
arship, it might also undermine their objectivity in reality as well. 
Changing social science might therefore leave the disciplines worse off, 
and the world unchanged. 
Before discussing the more general question, let me explain how I got 
involved in testifying. Since, as a historian, I have an occupational sus-
ceptibility to genetic explanations, my story will require a detour into 
4. See Alfred II. Kelly, "'Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair," Supreme Court 
Review (1965), ll9-58; and, on Bolden, J. Morgan Kousser, 'The Undermining of the 
First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second," in Extension of the Voting Rights Act: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the judiciary, House of Representatives, 97th Con-
gress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982), 2017-20. 
5. Lee Benson, "'Doing History as Moral Philosophy and Public Advoca('y: A Prac-
tical Strategy to Lessen the Crisis in American llistory," paper delivered at the Organi-
zation of American Historians' Convention, April I, 191H. 
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the history of civil rights law. It may not be straining words too much to 
assert that the Fifteenth Amendment contains an explicit reference to 
intent. The right to vote, it declares, shall not be "denied or abridged 
011 account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" (emphasis 
added). One reading of the phrase is that any law or practice adopted 
with a racially discriminatory intent ("on account of race") is by that fact 
alone unconstitutional. Despite the fact that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contains no language which even this clearly refers to intent, the 
courts have read an intent criterion into it. In fact, they have intermin-
gled the standards of proof and lines of cases under each of the two 
amendments, which would no doubt be confusing enough if separated, 
to such a degree that the whole area of the law has become covered with 
a sort of constitutional kudzu, a mass of pullulating, ever more tangled, 
parasitic vines which have long since grown over and hidden the original 
constitutional saplings. 
Thus, in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, the Supreme Court was content 
to assume that racially separate railroad cars were in fact equally com-
fortable and convenient, while it concentrated on denying that whites 
who imposed segregation intended it to be racially discriminatory. In 
Williams v. Mississippi in 1898, the Court admitted that the framers of 
the 1890 Mississippi Constitution intended to deny blacks the right to 
vote, but held that since the plaintifl.had not shown that their intent was 
carried out, he had not proved a constitutional violation. The next year, 
in Cumming v. Richmond County, the justices shunted aside the ob-
vious fact that the Augusta, Georgia school board discriminated when it 
provided two public high schools for whites, but closed the only one it 
had run for blacks, and focused on what Justice John Marshall Harlan 
took to be the crucial question-whether the school board had behaved 
"reasonably," or, in other words, without an intent to discriminate. Pre-
sented with evidence of both intent and effect in Giles v. Harris, a 1903 
voting case, that great liberal Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes threw up 
his hands and declared disfranchisement a "political question. "6 
More recent courts have hacked no clearer path through the judicial 
thicket of intent and effect. In Brown v. Board, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have assumed that if the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People's (NAACP's) lawyers and expert witnesses could 
show that segregation had bad effects on black children, then they need 
not prove that school officials acted intentionally to bring about those 
con.sequences, hut only that they had meant to segregate the schools, 
which of course all admitted. \\'here segregation was not formally es-
6 .. The citatio~JS are: Plessy, 163 U.S. 5.'37 (1896); Williams, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); 
Cummmg, 17?. U.S. 528 (1899); Giles, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). On these cases, see J. Mor-
gan Kousser, Undermining of the First Reconstruction," 2020-21, and "Separate But 
Not Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools ., 
Journal of Southern History 46 (1980), 17-44. ' 
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tahlished, however, the focus shifted to the school hoard's actions, such 
moves as gerrymandering attendance zones and siting new schools only 
in safely segregated areas being taken as evidence of the authorities' 
segregative intent. Segregation because of housing patterns (patterns 
which were no doubt partly produced by the actions of other gow·rn-
mental agencies, if not by the school boards), may have been indistin-
guishable in its effects from so-called de jure segregatio.n, hut since it 
was allegedly not intended, it was ruled constitutional, for example, 111 
the Detroit school case, Milliken v. Bradley.' 
That there were close parallels between the school cases and those in 
the voting rights and other areas is hardly surprising. Tuskegee, Ala-
bama gerrymandered its town boundaries so blatantly as to leave no 
question a~ to its racially discriminatory intent; therdi.>re, the Supreme 
Court could finesse the issue." In the initial reapportionment opinions, 
too, intent played little role, and attempts to achie\·e legislative ends 
which would in other cases have induced judicial obsequiousness were 
blithely shunted aside in the (lri\'t_' fi.>r a population ('quality eflect." Yet 
in the Indianapolis at-large voti11g case, Whitco111h , .. Chads, the Court 
ruled that evidence of a racially unequal impact, by itself, was not 
enough; whereas, a week later in the Jackson, \lississippi municipal 
swimming pool closi11g case, J'alllll'r v. TholllJISOII. it concluded that an 
overwhelming case based on intent was insufficient. to 
The lines between intt'nt ami effect crossed and re-crossed in what 
now seems to he the leadi11g Supreme Court case on at-large voting in 
multi-memlwr districts, \Vhite '· Hegestcr. Since the \"oting Bights Act 
and the Tweutv-f(nJrth AmeJJ<In•ent SIIS(H'JH!ed likracy tests and poll 
taxes, at-large ~·lections have hee11 perhaps the major de\· icc fi.>r abridg-
ing or "diluting" minority political power. In \\'hite, a 1973 case from 
Dallas, the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to 
proportional representation, and that at-large systt'ms arc not, per se, 
unconstitutional. They are illegal, however, if combined with other 
electoral devices which reduce the chanees of minorities to elect per-
7. Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. -183 (1954); ~lillikeu '· Bra<ll<'y, Ilk U.S. 
717 (1974). 
8. Gomillion v. Ligbtf(lOt, :l6·1 ll.S. :3.'39 (1960). Justice Stt'vt•ns appan·ntly yearns 
for those earlier, simplt:r days when diserinlination stood out like a nnddy dra\\ n twenty-
eight-sided figure. Set' his dissents in ~lobile v. Bolden, 4·lfi LIS. 55 (191>0). and Hogers 
v. Lodge, 50 lJ.S.L.W .. '5041 (ll.S. July I. 191>21. 
9. Baker v. Carr, 369ll.S. IH6 (1962); Gray v. Sanders . .'372 U.S. :36H (196:31: Wes-
berrv v. Sanders . .176 U S. 1 (1964). In some mort• recent reapportiontnt•nt caS<·s, such 
as tl;e HJ82 Georgia Congressional redistricting case. Busbee v. Smith .. 5-19 F. Stipp. ·19·1 
(D. D.C., HJI->2), tht' question of racially discriminatory intent has received central atl<'n-
tion. On the contradictions between the Court\ stance in reapportionnH'IIt and raci.tl volt' 
dilution cases set• James U. Blaekshcr and Larn· T. ~IPnefee. ··Front lle.yr~olds '·Sims to 
City o_f,\lobi/e v. Boldew llaw the \\"hilt' Suburbs Comnt<nJdt•t•n•d the I• Ifll'Pnlh :\mt'IHI-
mcntt" Haslir~gs Latc]ounw/3-l (19H2). 1-6·1. 
10. Whitcomb v. Chavis. 403 li.S. 124 i197ll; Palmer'· Th01npson. 4o:l liS. 217 
(1971). 
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sons of their choice, and if they occur in areas with a history of racial 
discrimination which is currently manifested in racially discriminatory 
slating groups, racial bloc voting, and a lack of responsiveness by offi-
cials to minority desires, or at least some of these. Further, direct evi-
dence that the system had been established or maintained for a racial 
purpose, if such evidence were available, would, insofar as one can be 
sure of any doctrinal consistency in this area of the law, be held to be 
probative. In the leading Appeals Court decision, Zimmer v. Mc-
Keithen, the White indicia were restated and refined, while in a series 
of mid- to late-l970s Supreme Court cases not directly related to multi-
member districts, the Court emphasized with increasing insistence that 
intent was central to all racial discrimination cases. 11 
White and Zimmer made clear that expert testimony by historians 
might be usefiii to paint a general picture of the history of racism, in or-
der, at the least, to educate judges or to remind them of social facts 
which they might otherwise prefer to forget. 12 And such testimony 
might be determinative if the historian could produce credible circum-
stantial or direct evidence that the intent of the framers of laws passed 
some time ago, now under challenge, was discriminatory. But whereas 
civil rights lawyers seem to have been well connected to a network of 
sociologists and political scientists who did research on voting rights, 
neither they nor the social scientists knew many historians, and histo-
rians were almost wholly ignorant of the relevant developments in the 
law. I was "discovered," if that is the correct word, by Edward Still, a 
particularly assiduous Birmingham lawyer with a pronounced historical 
bent (who has since gone on to do graduate work in history as a sideline) 
who read my book, called and recruited me, and mentioned my name 
to others. Thus, by the fateful day of April22, 1980, I had been engaged 
as an expert witness in two cases, in one of which I was to serve mainly 
the "educational" purpose of recounting the history of racism in South 
Carolina politics, and in the other of which my role was to show the dis-
criminatory intent behind a particular provision of the 190 l Alabama 
Constitution. 
11. White v. Hegester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 
(1973). The other leading relevant cast•s were \Vashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); 
Village of Arlington Heights v. l>letropolitan Housing Development Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 
(1977); and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. l<eent'y, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
The best discussion I have read on the topic is Larry C. Simon. "Haeially Prejudiced Gov-
ernnwntal Actions: A Motivation Tlwory of the Constitutional Ban Against Haeial Dis-
crimination," San Diego Late Review 15 (1978), 1041-1 1.'30. 
12. That social science exp<'rt witness testimony is often used to .. educate" judges is 
shown in Joseph Sanders et al., .. The Helevancc of.lrrdevant' Testimony: Why Lawyers 
Use Social Science Experts in School !).,segregation Cases," Law and Society Review 16 (1981-82), 403-28. 
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'l'l t f' A ,·J 22 198(1 which threw the civil rights forces into 1e even o pr , ,, . . 
what turned out to he a productive tizzy and which made h1stona~1~, 
·1 t least Ilt1t OIJ)v window-dressing but necessarv parhci-temporan y a . , . · , . . : . 
· t. ·gl t '·ases \Vas the SUJ)reme Courts decisiOn Ill Molnle pants Ill vo m g n 1 " . . , c • • 
v. Bolden.I:J Writing for a four-man plurality, Jushce Potter ~tewart, 
without explicitly overruling \Vhite v. Regester, reinter~Heted Its hold-
. · · r prt1of tlf di·scrimiintorv intent and demed that the so-mg as reqmrmg ' . . . , . 
called "Zimmer factors," which had been derived duef:ly from \\ lllte, 
added up to evidence of intent. To some observers, it <~ppeared th~1t the. 
Court, or at least the prevailing opinion, was demandmg p~o(~u.ctwn of 
t ·JJ . k. g af'ter fif'ty )'e·1rs or more· that is that plamtttls had to a gun s I smo In , , ' . 
ove that legislators who passed laws, often as long as a half-century ~~o, were actuated by racially discriminatory motives.'' Ifth.is intc~'Jlre­
tation stuck, the Justice Department, the NAACP Legal ~)efen,~c .Fund, 
the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, the Amencan. CIVIl L~h­
erties Union, and private attorneys for minority groups had little ch~Hce 
hut to call in the historia11s. The facts of Heconstruction, Hedemphon, 
and the Progressive Era became as relevant in the courtroom as regres-
sion analvses of racial hloc voting had been since 197:3. . 
At the time the Supreme Court heard Boldeu and a compam.on school 
hoard case from tvlobilc, Hrotcu v. Board, the lawyers lor IH'Ither Side 
had done all their historical honH·work. They traced the at-h:rge syste~JIS 
back to 1911 and 1919, respectively, and stopped there.\\ hen the s.ll-
preme Court remanded Boldc 11 and Brotni back to the federal dtstnct 
court, the Justice Department and the ~lohile counst·l \\·Iw had handled 
I f. tl NAA('I) ll)l' ·tssi.Stl'<ll>\' ·t historian located 111 t\loiHlc, t 1e case or 1e . - ~ , ' .. · . ' . . 
Peyton t\lcCrary, discovered that the at-large features ol the cl~'t:twn 
systems dated not from the teens, after most blacks had b~~en t!Islra~J­
chised in Alabama, but from the 1870s, when the threat of black poiit-
13. The chief danger f(Jr the 191l2 renewal of the \'oting Bights Act (VHA) was apathy., 
Since it r<'presentt·d a clear and present danger, "'!d not just a poll'utwl thre.at ''; 111~':;r/~} 
voting rights. particularly in the classic cent<'r of racism, the small-limn S:>u,t 1• . 1 1 11: 
made it much easier f(>r the civil rights f(>rces to work up enthuSiasm lor th'; .\ H A ,tmon.~ 
the membership of their organizations as well as among echtonai \\Tilers; I hus,. Jus~ Ice 
Stl,,v·trt was f(>r the VHA what Interior Secretary James Watt was lor the Cle,u: A
1
tr(;-\d . 
' . S'l 571F'1!209(::>tl IITiltt 14 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nevett v. , I< es, · · .-< , · . · 
. · · f' I I· · d "IS<I 1ing from \\raslungton v. !978) had tried, by comhmmg some o I w anguage an re, · t .. 
Davis and Arlington Heights with the Zimmer list, to bring thP two approaches mto t''0r 
form it · witlr each other. The "Zimmer factors" could he read as mchcatJvc, If not 0 t le 
motiv:s of the framers of the law, then of those of the ethnic majority an,<~ t~e el.tlt'. \a~ers 
who maintained the political system at the time. It now appears that Stt:l tl ~as._'1B"/I~r 
predictor of the Court's eventual position (in Rogers v. Lodge) than w~~s.Stt·w~r~~ .': ~ l~ 
opinion. For a "smoking gun" rt'ading of Holden, see Avtam Soifer. Com plan!"} an< 
Constitutional Law," Ohio State Law Jou rna/ 42 (1981 ), 404. 
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icalJ.)()W~.'r was much more p<~~pable. 1.s I was brought in principally to 
JHOVHle full penod coverage, as one would say in the history job mar-
ket, since !vlcCrary's scholarly research had heeu on the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, while my specialty has been the post-Reconstruction 
and·· Progressive" eras. 
Researching the cases felt familiar. I started with some general but 
not unshakable belief~ about how the world works and how historians 
should seek ~o explain things, a hypothesis to test, and some prior 
knowledge of election laws and of the place and period. After culling 
through the evidence, I tried to organize it to bring it to bear on the 
question of wh~ the Alabama legislature passed a law providing for at-
large e~edions for Mobile in a certain year. It was only in preparing for 
and gomg through cross-examination and watching others be cross-ex-
amined that the question of biases different from those encountered in 
more traditional scholarly pursuits arose. (How dare opposing counsel 
im~Jly that I would shade the truth to make a point for the sake of money 
or Ideology!) But once opened, the question of objectivity would not-
willnot-recede entirely horn my consciousness. Somewhat different 
research experiences in three other cases, in which I worked with and 
against diflerent lawyers anJ before different judges, expanded my ex-
perience, but did not change the nature of the questions or answers 
about objectivity. 
What does scholarly objectivity in history consist in, how do one's val-
ues ~nter into one's normal scholarship, and is the situation any differ-
ent for one preparing to testify as an expert witness? First values 
I ' . ' tastes, ta ents, and circumstances guide one's initial choice of topic. 
\Vhat seems interesting to one person may bore another-! like tables 
and equations, and narrative puts me to sleep, but I recognize that other 
people's views differ, though I cannot account for their egregious pref-
erences. As a southern white liberal with a life-long interest in politics, 
I natur~l~y gravitated toward political history, more specifically south-
ern poltttcal htstory, and even more particularly the politics of race and 
15. The opinion ~Jn remand is Bolden v. City of Mol>ile, 5·12 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Al-
abama 191)2). In lus}lrSt Bolden '.>pin~on (Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 397 
(S.D. Ala. 1976)): lederal D1stnct Court Judge Virgil Pittman, who decided in favor of 
tbt;. black plam!.llls, dtaractcrized the situation after passage of the Alabama Constitution 
~~ . race-proof. by which he meant that race could not haw been a motive for legislative 
at110n Ill 19Il because most blacks were disfranchised then. In the remand, the plaintiffs 
produced eVidence, put together primarily by McCrary, which showed that enough blacks 
were regi~!t'red to vote in the years following 1901) in 1vlobil<' to pose a threat to carry or 
senously mHuenc<• at least on<' ward. had a ward systl'm been adopted. Even if this ·had 
not been so, however. the "r~ce-proof situation" argument has always struck me as curi-
ous. Ifblaeks W!'re excluded lor reasons of race from participating in a decision which even 
bventually afleded them. why wasn'tthc process itself so tainted that the system should 
de thrown outr If 1t be feared that tim would result in the overturning of all laws passed 
~nng the whole penod, the answer is that those which have no present discriminatory 
e ect are therefore not unconstitutional. 
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class in the South. Others with different burJens or penchants would 
consider such topics dull, but sex or death or women fascinating. I find 
all three subjects absorbing-but not to read about. !\I uch good history, 
too, is written by people caught up in special circumstances or sur-
roundings. Local history examples too numerous to detail spring to 
mind, but other cases would include Trevor-Roper's work on Hitler's last 
days, occasioned by his participation in a British intelligence task liJJTe, 
and C. Vann \Voodwanl's Battle .for Leyte Gulf, a product of his wartime 
Washington navy job of eonsolidating and making sense of battle re-
ports. 16 . 
The prevailing research agenda determines other choices of topics. A 
subject elosely related to a currently "hot" topic in a field may get a 
scholar a grant, and will nearly guarantee a longer vita, perhaps a prize, 
and mavbe even tenure. Equally good work l~tr from conventional in-
terests ~viii saddle one with a reputation (if any) as a person who may he 
"solid," hut who works on dull or strange topics, or (if one is very lucky 
or insightful) eventual, possibly posthumous recognition as a "pioneer." 
Similarly, the whims of funding agencies are not entirely irrelevant to 
the activities of academics or at kast to the packaging of those endeav-
ors. It was no coincidence that when the Nixon administration began 
pouring money into the National Cancer Institute. cann·r research he-
came a growth area in biology. As all these examples ~how, value-laden 
or self-interested reasons li>r dwo~ing research topic~ are so omnipre-
sent that it is di!Ticult to imagine sonH'Oill' who could not be f;tulted for 
having a bias in choice of topics. Indeed. it is hard to undnstand what 
it would mean to sav that sonH'OIH' had chosen his topic "ohjedin·k" 
As a consequence, ~ny charge on this ground of a lack of objectivity fi>r 
a historian doing legal casework must he nol-prossed. 
A second consideration related to objectivity is in the assumptions a 
historian or anv other social scientist makes and in the ways in which he 
or she fi>rmulates the chief questions. Here, I must confess to bias. I be-
lieve in making assumptions, reasoning processes, and conclusions as 
clear and explicit as possible. Some historians practice and even preach 
obfuscation for art's sake, and many social scientists purvey muddled-
ness in the name of science. I intend otherwise, even if I do not always 
attain the desired result. 1' Furthermore, I am an unabashed Occamite 
16. II ugh R. Tremr-Ropn, Tltc Last Days of Hitler (London: Macmillan and Com-
pany, 1947); C. \'ann Woodward, Thl' Battle for· Leyte Gulf I New York: t.lacmillan aud 
Company, W47). . . . 
17. Caltech colleagues have poinkd out to me that this sd of beli..fs may partially ac-
count h>r mv being chosen as an exp<·rt witness. that if I WPH' less iuclin<·d to generalize 
and to stat<•.condusions baldlv. or, converwly, felt less coiiiJWIIed to spell out tlw stq>S in 
my arguments. lawyt·rs wotol;l not have chosen mP. This ohwrvatiou does not, howen·r. 
reflect adverselv on the ease fin comparati\l' objccti\ity in expert witnessing. It l'l<'rely 
suggests that tl;e decision rule I(Jr lawyers choosing expnts should be to pick tl"'"' t•x-
perts who, in their scholarly work, openly state their results and tlw prcw<·ss by wlueh they 
arrived at them. It implies nothing about the further remark, quotl'<l at the begnutn.tg of 
this paper, about choosing witnesses who will say "what a partieular side wants said. 
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(~hat is, I have a strong preference for parsimonious explanations); a con-
firmed believer in rational, maximizing behavior, especially by those 
ca~culating perso.ns, politicians; and a person with very low Bayesian 
pn~ns about umHt~~nded consequences. If I find blacks-or poor 
wlHtes-shut out of politics, I immediately suspect that it didn't just 
happen to turn out that way, and I have faith that if I find the means em-
ployed and the wills involved in perpetrating the causal act or acts, the 
protagonists and their weapons in one geographical area will closely re-
semble those in other places, and the basic reasons for their activities 
will be simple. 
.Y~t ~~~ speaking of .~his as a "bias," I mean "predisposition" or "pro-
cl~vity rather than unalterable presupposition." All scholars begin 
With some proclivities such as these, and nearly all scholars alter their 
l~redispt~sitions little by little as they accumulate more experience. 
So~~· either as neophytes or at some stage in their lives before (or after) 
~er.ulity, pre.fer complexity, assume irrationality, and deny intent aprior-
Istlcally. It IS to be hoped, however, that both forest people and trees 
people, while they might be attracted to different facets of the scenery, 
wou~d at least be able to agree roughly on what trail to follow through a 
particular wood. Less metaphorically, a modeler might admit the in-
adequacies of his schema in representing a certain situation while a 
perso11 of idiographic propensity might agree that uncomplicat~d expla-
nations are sometimes correct. In any event, differences in such as-
sumptions color scholarly and contracted work equally. If I sin, it is in 
monographs as well as in testimony. Yet since one inevitably must make 
some such leaps of faith, since one cannot escape these fundamental 
episte.mological issues even by ignoring them, making them ca11 not rob 
one of objectivity unless objectivity is never possible. The directed ver-
dict on cou11t two must therefore be acquittal. · 
. ~hird, did the procedure for examining evidence, which admittedly 
d1flers from that I would normally adopt, bias my conclusions, therefore 
robhi11g the project of objectivity? Generally, after deciding what to 
s~udy, picking out, in a preliminary fashion at least, what principal ques-
tiOns to ask, and ransacking the secondary literature, I would go through 
a.s many prnn.ary documents as are available-newspapers, manuscripts 
(If any), official documents, voting returns. This procedure reflects a 
professional tradition in history which stretches back at least to the es-
tahlis~un~nt of th~ first American graduate programs a hundred years 
ago. 1 he Image of the lonely scholar, or perhaps, to modernize it a bit, 
of th~ lm~ely research team, seeking truth by applying their open but 
car~ful mmds to the appropriate evidence, is pervasive among social sci-
~ntJsts .and .humanists. Scholars may make mistakes, study uninterest-
mg topics, fail to express themselves well, or even reflect unconsciously 
the popular world view or disciplinary paradigm dominant at the time 
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thev're working, but they don't, in this standard stereotype, purposely 
distort. Truth is produced by what might be called a "linear" process. 
In the adversary tradition, on the other hand, truth is assumed to 
emerge, if at all, as part of a dialectical process. The lawyer's ideal world 
is, in this respect, rather like Adam Smith's: when every lawyer seeks 
simultaneously to maximize the chances of his or her own client, assum-
ing that each abides by some fundamental rules of fairness, an Invisible 
Hand guides the process toward the maximum production of truth. 
Lawyers are supposed to be advocates, to represent their clients. They 
are not to pursue some abstract "truth" or "social good," but only the 
very relative interests of the people who hire their services. Graduate 
schools and law schools may often cohabit on the same campus, but in 
their self-conceptions, they have long since divorced. This separation 
breeds deep suspicion on each side of the other's pretensions and pro-
cesses. 
Despite suspicions, I have had to accept the fact that in the cases I 
have worked on, others-the Justice Department, the LD F or other 
lawyers for the plain tills, and the lawyers and experts. for the localities 
whose electoral systems arc being challenged-perform most of the 
culling of primary. sources. I read what they send nH' and what I specif-
icallv ask for. This would worry me more if the documents were secret 
or p~ivate, or if the lawyers with whom I've worked denied requests li>.r 
papers or documents I asked thent to look for, or if the lawyers on each 
side didn't have a strong interest in confro11ting the court with all the 
evidence which could possibly buttress their positions. In fad, none of 
the material is private; and e\'t•ry request I'n· made li>r information-
and I've been bothersome, in order to insure that I look at C\'t•rything 
which might be relevant-has been complied with. r..ton·m·t·r, it ap-
pears to be in the nature of research for such litigation that the lawyers 
(exactly like scholars in this respect) don't know just how to put together 
the facts or which facts will turn out to be of relevance until very close 
to the last moment. They do the research when they can, drib and drab 
it out to prospective experts, put it all together the last night. Thus, 
time pressures and lack of complete foresight guard against their stack-
ing any but the most obvious evidence. . 
Only two things about the process are bothersome. In the first place, 
even if the adversary process leads to truth, it's less likely toil the legal 
talent on each side is unequal. And I'm afraid that the acumen of counsel 
on the side of those chargi11g discrimination has almost always been su-
perior, in the cases I've been in, to that of the defenders of at-large v~>t­
ing. In other words, I can't he sure that the other side would rccogmze 
evidence for their cases if it jumped off the page at them. In the second 
place, despite the extensive discovery procedures which drag out mod-
ern litigation, lawyers have a gaming tendency which leads them to hold 
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ba<.:k evidence until cross-examination. And there is a natural contrary 
tendency fi1r a witness to sti<.:k to his guns when challenged, to consider 
cross-questioning a combat, and therefore to disregard evidence offered 
at this time against his case. No one wants to look f(lO!ish or contradic-
tory, or to conclude that he wasted his time. 
These doubts are connected with a fourth consideration, that of ad-
vocacy. Does the fact that one is making a case, is part of a team with a 
particular value-laden objective, by itself undermine the usual stan-
dards of scholarly objectivity? In all but one respect, I think it doesn't. 
After all, scholars do get committed to particular arguments-the Civil 
War was or was not irrepressible, the living standard of the working class 
in England rose or fdl in the nineteenth century, the American Revo-
lution was primarily an intellectual or alternatively a social movement-
and they rarely chan~e t.heir minds. (One might note, parenthetically, 
that the same state of aflairs characterizes the physical sciences, for as 
Thomas Kuhn has pointed out, defenders of old paradigms rarely 
switch, they just retire.)lH Nonetheless, scholars sometimes modify 
their stands, particularly on relatively minor points. They circulate pa-
pers and accept criticisms, alter some treatments in subsequent edi-
tions of books, at times even confess error. The trouble with a trial is that 
it's a one-shot aflair, that one goes from expression to publication without 
circulation, copy editing, or galley proofs. Since one can hardly call up 
the judge six months later and say ''I've changed my mind; I was wrong," 
the pr?cess of lengthy contemplation of one's interpretation, a usual 
part of scholarship, is necessarily private and naturally truncated for an 
expert witness. 
A fifth point follows closely in train. It is the core of the objectivity 
question. Did one pick only those pieces of evidence which fit one's 
case, and did one twist the story to bypass evidence which could not be 
ignored? Here, the adversary process seems to provide a safeguard at 
least equal to those in academia. To most judges, the most credible ex-
pert witnesses are persons who have published fairly widely on the topic 
or on kindred ones. To most lawyers, risk-averse souls who prefer not to b: surprised during trials, the best witnesses are experienced ones. 
~mce books, articles, and previous testimony, affidavits, and deposi-
t~o.ns are matters of public record, an expert who takes contradictory po-
SitiOns on two similar pieces of evidence or similar positions on two con-
tradictory pieces of evidence is placing his reputation at risk in a bet not 
only on the stupidity of opposing counsel in the instant case, but in 
every other case to come. 
Furthermore, it is somewhat easier, indeed, it is unavoidable in wit-
nessing, to make oneself conscious of contrary cases. Even if the other 
18. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific lietoo/utious (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
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side's barristers are inferior, at least in this rather specialized area of the 
law, one always overprepares for cross-examination, and one is pressed 
in the moot court tradition by one's own side. No doul1t lawyers mi~ht 
pull their punches to avoid unsettling their own witnes~e.s, but that sa 
dangerous course, because the witness might sense duplrnt:• or the eon-
tending lawyers might pull offlucky shots. ~loreover, the witness, m~Jre 
frightened of a courtroom than the lawyers are, natura.lly tnes to thmk 
of every possible question. The whole process, therefore, encourages 
the questioning and testing of interpretations much more than do nor-
mal scholarly procedures. 
The sixth and final question breaks the analogy with re~ular scholai:-
ship, and rests on a counterf~tctual though.t exp~r~m;nt.' II I wer.e testi-
fving for the other side, would my conclusions drflerr I feel certam that, 
;t least in the cases in which I have been involved, they would not.: I 
would find evidence of an intent to discriminate in the passage or mam-
tenance of the system. I also recognize that if my analysis did vary <I.e-
pending 011 whom I was working with, my days as a credible expert wit-
ness would lw over. I e\'en half wish that some local gon·rnment would 
retain me-they seem to pay better than the LD F orLegal Servict's t~r 
even the Justice Department, and it would IH' satisfying to take their 
money and then upset their case. Still, out· aspect of tlw quest ron !~oth­
ers me: assuming that if I did appear I would speak truthfully and tully, 
u_·mdd I testify for the other side'~ .. 
The difficultv is that expert witnt'sses generally do more than tt·strly. 
Unless thev ar~' brought in at the \'t'l'Y last nwml·nt or are working with 
extremelv ;>Verbearing, absurdly self-confidt'nt lawyers, witnesses IISII-
ally han: some role in organizing cases and especially in planning IT-
seareh on the facts. For if they do not understand their ease, they cannot 
know what is relevant, and if they don't assist in and partly direl'l the 
gathering of the fads, they cannot he sure they have seen all the im-
portant evidence. Even if, as "educational" witnesses, cxp~rts. are 
chiefly used to report on the state of research in some <~cadcmic ~eld, 
thev will have to know enough to know when to stop talking-a difficult 
thi 1~g for professors in the best of circumstances-and they wil.l proha~ 
bly be asked fiJr advice on other aspects of the case, on other, witness~s 
reputations, on how to rebut their testimony, and so on. l<.xpert wit-
nesses do not merely' give opinions; they join a company. 
Since, as a person, I believe strongly in racial equality, and since, as 
a social scientist, I find the empirical and theoretical evidence of tht' ra-
cially discriminatory impact of at-large systems overwhelming, could I 
work with lawyers who were attempting to preserve an at-large systei~I 
in a jurisdiction which included a large and geographically separate mi-
nority group? (Other, analogous questions would occur to other poten-
tial expert witnesses or to me in other contexts.) Should the answt'r de-
pend on the degree of oppression in each individual case, and how can 
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that be gauged, especially before one knows much about the particular 
facts? Or should every situation be analogized to that of a chemical en-
gineer in Nazi Germany being asked to perform experiments to deter-
mine the least costly hut most eiTicient combination of gases lethal to 
hunwns-an objective, value-free scientific question in a sense, but a 
request which few, in hindsight at least, would agree to honor. 
This last question is but a variation on the Faustian quandary: should 
one compromise with evil, and, if so, how far? While I am not preten-
tious enough to hazard a general answer, I do have some observations. 
First, the learned alchemist's dilemma was one-sided. It wasn't the 
Lord, but the Devil who offered him fame and fortune in exchange for 
his soul. Presumably, if the proposition had originated in the upper, in-
stead of in the nether regions, the good doctor would have had no sec-
om! thoughts. Likewise, an expert who bears witness truthfully and for 
the side he or she favors as a citizen does not, on this count, jeopardize 
his or her virtue. Second, to the extent that scholarship, however in-
tended, is ever usable, either as a direct influence on current policy or 
by providing a general background, a context, or a part of the learning 
experience of the makers of present or future policy, the dilemma is 
inescapable. The scholar publishes, and, having done so, loses control 
over the uses to which his or her material can be put. 
Let me illustrate this last point with a personal anecdote. For a con-
geries of empirical and value-laden reasons, I favor abolition of the elec-
toral college. This age-old question was debated seriously and actually 
voted on by the U.S. Senate in July of 1979. In an extension of remarks 
section of the Congressional Record which dates from that time, I had 
the honor, if that is the proper phrase, to be cited a dozen times in are-
port prepared by the Congressional Hesearch Service which was in-
serted into the record by a senator. I!J This was the first time that my 
name appeared in the Congressional Record, and it may well be the 
last. Although I am not a daily devotee of that publication, a friend who 
noticed it was kind enough to send it to me. The trouble was, I was cited 
to support the case against abolishing the electoral college, and, as if to 
~cap on the insults, the senator who requested the study and had it put 
mto the Record was one whose actions rarely fail to outrage me, Orrin 
Hatch. To top it off, shortly after I had posted a response to a sympa-
thetic senator, in which I tried to show that my work and other evidence, 
while cited correctly, had been employed superficially, and that a 
deeper analysis of southern voting patterns in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries really supported the case for abolition, rather than the 
converse, I learned that the vote on the electoral college had just taken 
place, and that my small contribution could no longer even add a his-
torical grace note to the debate. Although I had hatched no Faustian 
19. Congressiv11al Record-Senate (June 1.1, 1979), S7604-S76l5. 
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l . rgain and gained neither glory nor remuneration from this episode )<I , '1' 
of scholarly "influence" on public policy, my words had Jone the Devi s 
work just as surely. 
The process by which a fundamentally honest expert witness arrives 
at conclusions, I have tried to argue, differs less from that whicb honest 
scholars employ in their everyday work than is sometimes charged. In-
sofar as they do diverge, moreover, it is by no means clear that the nor-
mal procedures guarantee more objective resu.lts than thos.e a .witn~ss 
uses. Warren Miller's statement al~out the diflere.nt mottva~.tons m-
volved in trying to "do good" and to' find out ho~ tlungs wor~, <JUOt:d 
at the beginning of this paper, is not in accord with I~1Y expenence. F,or 
potential assaults on a scholar's objectivity are possible anywher.e: -~o­
cial scientists' virtue is no more at stake as they walk down th:- d,u k al-
leys of policy relevance than it is on the brightly-lit stree~s of tl~e :am-
v tll"r I·f I·I1ste·Hl of confining themselves closelv m their IVory pus. rill' L , , , • • , ' • 
t 
. s tiH·v broadcast their thoughts, ltke paper airplanes, dov.n mto 
OWl r. , . I . I' 'I f 
II . l)<JI)ular mists tlwv can no longer control whether t w1r rag• e era ts le , , f' . '1' 
are wafted on winds of change or on counter-currents o rcactwn. ore-
turn to the metaphor with which I began, historians should. regard 
themselves, and should be rcganlcd by lawyers <~ll(l judg:·s, n~·I.thcr as 
virgins nor as memhns of that other ancient profession. 1 estdymg and 
scholaring arc about equally objcdi\'!' pursuits. 
